Alternative Payment Vehicles in Contingent Valuation: The Case of Genetically Modified Foods by Kontoleon, Andreas et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Alternative Payment Vehicles in
Contingent Valuation: The Case of
Genetically Modified Foods
Andreas Kontoleon and Mitsuyasu Yabe and Laura Darby
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, UK
2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1827/
MPRA Paper No. 1827, posted 17. February 2007
Alternative Payment Vehicles in Contingent Valuation: 
The Case of Genetically Modified Foods 
 
Andreas Kontoleon1, Mitsuyasu Yabe2, and Laura Darby1  
 
1Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, UK 
2Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Kyushu University, Japan 
 
 
 
Jan 2005 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, a secondary consumer food survey is used to explore the role of the payment vehicle in 
contingent valuation.  More specifically, the paper investigates the household willingness-to-pay in the 
UK for a GM and non-GM labelling program under two alternative payment vehicles: 1) a standard 
product tax, under which consumers must trade-off some of their personal income for the labelling 
program; and 2) a taxation reallocation scheme, whereby consumers must trade-off some amount of 
their household’s taxation money that is currently spent on other government-funded goods. Contrary to 
previous valuation research, the willingness-to-pay under each vehicle is not found to be statistically 
significantly different, suggesting that in the case study investigated here, the marginal values of private 
income and other public goods in the UK are approximately equal. 
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 1 – INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The Importance of the Payment Vehicle in Contingent Valuation 
Contingent valuation (CV), a survey-based methodology for eliciting consumers’ valuations of non-
market resources, has been applied by researchers and policy-makers for several decades (Jacobsson & 
Dragun, 1996:90).1  While there is still some controversy over its application (see Hanemann, 1994; 
Diamond & Hausman, 1994), a number of issues associated with its use have been tested and loosely 
resolved, for example, by inclusion in best-practice guidelines (Jacobsson & Dragun, 1996:93; Arrow et 
al, 1993).   
 
One issue that would appear to have been given relatively limited attention, however, concerns the 
payment vehicle (PV), and in particular the form of its application.  Indeed, while a number of feasible 
PVs have been analysed, including income, sales and property taxes, trust fund payments, entry fees and 
changes in utility bills (Garrod & Willis, 1999:132), one important real-life PV has until recently been 
ignored by CV practitioners.  The PV in question concerns a reallocation of taxation funds, a payment 
mechanism which would appear to be a common source of policy financing given the political 
unpopularity of imposing new taxes or charges.   
 
The potential impact of a tax reallocation vehicle on CV results may have important implications for 
policy-makers basing their decisions on valuation research.  Indeed, if the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
a particular non-market resource differs under a tax reallocation vehicle as compared to a more 
traditional PV, it is important that policy-makers intending to finance a resource by way of tax 
reallocation, base their decisions on studies using the correct payment scenario.  Alternatively, if there is 
little difference between WTP values under the different vehicles, traditional studies may be able to 
provide policy-makers with approximate resource valuations.   
 
To date, only one paper by Bergstrom et al (2004) has attempted to examine the tax reallocation PV and 
compare it to more traditional payment mechanisms. This paper attempts to add to this emerging 
literature, and in particular, answer Bergstrom et al’s (2004:14) call for further empirical investigation 
into this unique valuation and financing approach. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
In this paper the primary aim is to compare and evaluate WTP measures for a non-market good under 
two different payment scenarios. The first is under a product tax, a more typical PV, where consumers 
must trade-off their personal income for the non-market good.  The second is under a tax reallocation 
scheme where consumers must trade off some amount of their household’s taxation money that is 
currently spent on other government-funded goods.  This comparison is achieved using a case study on 
                                                          
1 For a recent and full exposition of the contingent valuation methodology see Bateman et al (2002). 
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the WTP for the separation and labelling of genetically modified (GM) and non-GM foods, an issue of 
some interest given recent European Union (EU) legislation on GM labelling and traceability.   
 
Through the case study, and use of secondary consumer food survey data, this paper addresses two 
further objectives.  The first of these is to determine the WTP of households in the United Kingdom 
(UK) for the separation and labelling of GM and non-GM foods, and the second is to examine the 
particular explanatory factors that contribute to this WTP.  The exploration of these secondary 
objectives enables this paper to add to a growing literature that applies valuation techniques to issues of 
biotechnology. 
 
The overall structure of this paper is as follows.  In Section 2 the paper discusses PVs and their role in 
CV methodology, as well as surveying the existing empirical literature regarding PV effects. A 
conceptual model is then developed based on the work of Bergstrom et al (2004) which explores how 
product tax and tax reallocation PVs affect the WTP for non-market goods.  In Section 3, the paper 
introduces the GM case study, and explains why this is a useful and policy-relevant scenario under 
which to test PV hypotheses.  Information about methodology, data and variables is provided in Section 
4, and an examination of the estimation results presented in Section 5.  Policy considerations and 
conclusions are discussed in Section 6. 
 
2 – THEORY AND LITERATURE 
2.1 The Role and Impact of the Payment Vehicle in Contingent Valuation 
Although CV is often criticised, it continues to be widely researched and utilized to measure non-market 
values (Champ et al, 2002:591).  Given the methodology’s popularity, it is therefore important to 
understand how its major elements can impact upon the elicitation of valid and reliable WTP values.  
The PV is one such element in the application of CV as it provides the context in which respondents are 
to pay their offered bids (Morrison et al, 2000:407; Cummings et al, 1986:31).  Indeed, while early CV 
literature focused only on the direct role of the resource in question, by assuming all other elements of 
the hypothetical market to be neutral (Hoevenagel, 1990), it is now recognized that the valuation process 
itself will depend on all elements of the CV scenario, including the PV (Jacobsson & Dragun, 1996:86).  
That is, respondents in CV studies do not value levels of provision of a resource in abstract, but rather 
value a complete policy package under which one cannot separate the value of the resource from the 
procedures by which the resource is provided and payment is made (Mitchell & Carson, 1989:124; 
Cummings et al, 1986:209).   
 
Different WTP estimates from different PVs are therefore not an unexpected result (Jacobsson & 
Dragun, 1996:89), and there is persistent empirical evidence that the form of the PV has a significant 
impact on CV outcomes.  For example, in an early PV study, Rowe et al (1980) found that the WTP for 
landscape values was significantly greater under an income tax than an entrance fee, while more 
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recently, Bateman et al (1995) found respondents were also WTP more for wetland protection under an 
income tax than a contribution to a charity or trust fund.   
 
Given that PVs can be expected to alter CV results, PV bias generally refers not to specific variations in 
offered values and PVs (Cummings et al, 1986:209), but rather where the PV is either misperceived or 
is itself valued in a way not intended by the researcher (Mitchell & Carson, 1989).  For example, if a PV 
is implausible or objectionable to a respondent, they may treat the elicitation question as hypothetical 
and modify their true bid, or refuse to answer the valuation question in protest (Morrison et al, 2000: 
408; Jacobsson &Dragun, 1996:89).   
 
In an attempt to avoid bias, it is recommended that a PV meet a number of key criteria.  Bateman et al 
(2002:4.25,8.21) explain that an effective PV must be credible, relevant, acceptable and coercive, as 
well as being carefully pre-tested before a full CV survey is carried out.  They suggest that the simplest 
guideline is to use the PV most closely representing that which is likely to be employed by the real-
world decision.  Garrod and Willis (1999:132) emphasize that the chosen vehicle must have a plausible 
connection with the resource it is being used to value, and also be perceived to be “fair” and “equitable” 
in its incidence and in relation to those deriving benefits from the proposed policy.  For example, 
Greenley et al (1981) in a CV study on improving recreation amenities found that the WTP under a sales 
tax was four times as much as under an increase in residential sewerage fees.  This was partly due to 
escalating sewerage fees, but primarily because respondents felt it was unfair that tourists would be able 
to benefit from the proposed improvements under the latter scenario without contributing to the 
expense.  According to Jacobsson & Dragun (1996:89) and Morrison et al (2000:407), PVs should also 
be appropriate to the cultural and institutional arrangements particular to the location of the study, as 
well as being perceived as directly linked to the provision of the resource in question (Hanemann, 
1995:89). 
 
CV practitioners tend to classify PVs into two broad categories (Bergstrom et al, 2004:2).  Those 
measured by direct income changes where the payment is fixed regardless of the amount of the resource 
consumed, such as tax levies and license fees; and those measured by commodity price changes where 
the payment can be adjusted by altering the amount of the resource consumed, such as entrance fees and 
utility bills.  Bateman et al (2002:4.13) suggest that the use of the latter category can pose problems in 
CV, as respondents may state a positive WTP for a resource change, but simply adjust the quantity 
consumed so that their total expenditure remains the same.   
 
An alternative classification of PVs is to group them by voluntary vehicles, a particular example of 
Bergstrom et al’s second category, and coercive vehicles, such as taxes, prices and fees (Bateman et al, 
2002:4.13).  Each of these categories has different implications for strategic behaviour and the 
possibility of PV bias.   
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Voluntary contributions, for example, provide an opportunity to free-ride, and respondents have an 
incentive to overstate their WTP to secure provision of a resource, and then decide at a later point 
whether or not to provide the pledged funds (Carson, 1997:1503).  Hanemann (1995:90) explains that 
most appeals for donations are not designed to elicit maximum WTP values and therefore represent a 
flawed paradigm for CV.  This is because voluntary PV studies often simply ask for some donation, 
without identifying the particular consequences or outcomes that would not be able to occur without it.  
Garrod and Willis (1999:157) suggest respondents may actually be likely to contribute less than their 
true bid value when faced with a voluntary PV, as they may perceive it as an ineffectual mechanism, 
with only a small proportion of funds going to the resource in question, as opposed to management 
costs.  This was seen to be a contributing factor in Jacobsson and Dragun’s (1996) valuation of wildlife 
protection, where respondents were WTP significantly higher bids under an income tax than a donation 
to a trust fund. Hidano and Kato (2002) in their landscape amenity study explain that bid values might 
also be significantly lower under voluntary PVs because respondents feel it is inequitable if not 
everyone benefiting from a policy is compelled to pay.  Bateman et al (2002:4.13) suggest that there is 
some consensus that voluntary PVs should generally be avoided, particularly due to the “insurmountable 
problems of free-riding.”  However, they suggest that ultimately the choice of the PV will depend on the 
resource being studied and the context in which it is likely to be provided. 
 
Coercive PVs, while generally more incentive compatible than voluntary vehicles (Carson, 1997:1503) 
are still prone to PV bias.  For example, taxes may be seen as more credible than donations, particularly 
if respondents believe that they ensure everyone pays and that funds are fully channeled.  However, 
taxes might equally be seen as less credible and worthy only of a protest response if respondents focus 
on the exclusion of non-tax payers from the vehicle (Bateman et al, 2002:4.13), or do not trust that the 
funds raised will go to the resource in question (Green & Tunstall, 1999:247).  Indeed, in the UK and 
some other countries, taxes are generally not hypothecated (Bateman et al, 2002:4.13, 8.21).  This 
means a respondent may adjust her true WTP downwards after assessing the risk that a WTP for one 
good will simply be raised through a tax and then that sum will be applied to a different purpose (Green 
& Tunstall, 1999:247).  Johnston et al’s (1999) findings appear to support this hypothesis as they 
provide evidence that the WTP for a watershed management package is significantly greater under a tax 
constitutionally guaranteed to fund the package in question, than under a tax with no secure funding 
guarantee.  This fits with Bateman et al’s (1995) broader suggestion that as the expected probability of a 
resource being provided decreases, so too do WTP values. 
 
2.2 A New Form of Payment Vehicle – The Tax Reallocation 
Bergstrom et al (2004) have recently added a new form of PV to the CV literature, the tax reallocation 
(TR).  The TR alters neither income nor commodity prices, but instead relies on a reallocation of the 
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governments existing taxation funds.  Bergstrom et al (2004:2) explain that this PV reallocates fixed 
expenditures to finance new non-market goods, thereby decreasing the amount of a household’s taxation 
money that can be spent on other government-funded goods.  The potential for a TR to be an appropriate 
PV in particular situations has been previously recognised in CV studies, even though it has not until 
recently been specifically tested.  For example, in Morrison et al’s (2000) study on the WTP for an 
environmentally friendly drainage pipe, 32% of the pre-test sample proposed that the government 
should pay for this project out of existing taxation funds. 
 
Given that many non-market goods may in practice be financed by TRs rather than by imposing new 
and politically unpopular taxes, Bergstrom et al’s (2004) study is highly policy relevant.  This relevance 
is only increased given that their results suggest that welfare measures corresponding to a TR may not 
be influenced by nominal income, and therefore may have the potential to lead to socially desirable 
public good allocation decisions from a cost-benefit analysis standpoint (Bergstrom et al, 2004:12). 
 
In their study on the TR mechanism, Bergstrom et al (2004) develop the theoretical welfare measures 
that correspond to this new PV, as well as examining the implications and limitations of valuing and 
financing resources using this technique.  The conceptual model they develop will be fully explored in 
Section 2.3.  
 
To test their model, Bergstrom et al (2004) use a case study of a groundwater protection program in the 
United States (US) to compare the dichotomous-choice WTP acceptance rate under a TR vehicle with 
the WTP acceptance rate under a more standard tax levy.  The null hypothesis that the acceptance rates 
are the same is rejected, and the TR is found to generate a mean WTP value almost eighteen times 
higher than a tax levy2. Bergstrom et al (2004:12) explain that this provides evidence that respondents 
are more willing to trade-off other government-funded goods for the water quality program than they are 
to trade off their own disposable income. 
 
2.3 The Conceptual Framework 
The following framework is based on Bergstrom et al (2004:2-5), and briefly describes the theoretical 
structure of CV welfare estimation for a standard tax and for a TR.  An intuitive interpretation of these 
welfare measures is also presented. 
 
It should be noted that while the case study investigated in this paper involves a product tax to pay for 
GM food separation and labelling, this tax is placed on what was uncovered to be a completely inelastic 
commodity, supermarket food3.  Therefore, although technically a household could adjust the amount of 
                                                          
2 Similar results are also obtained under Bergstrom et al’s (2004) open-ended questionnaire. 
3 Only 8 respondents in the sample claimed they would reduce the amount of food purchased if presented with a product 
tax.  Only 4 respondents claimed they would reduce this amount by more than 5%, with 3 of these appearing to be 
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food consumed once presented with this tax, this was not found to be an issue, and the tax faced by each 
household can be regarded as fixed.  Accordingly, it is assumed in this paper that the product tax can be 
analysed in exactly the same manner as Bergstrom et al’s (2004) treatment of their standard tax levy 
scenario. 
 
2.3.1 Welfare Measure for a Standard Tax 
The indirect utility function and the expenditure function provide the theoretical structure for welfare 
estimation in CV, with the aim being to estimate the changes in one of these functions.  This change, 
once isolated, measures the net increment in income that is equivalent to, or compensates for, an 
exogenous change in the quantity or quality of a resource (Haab & McConnell, 2002:6). Where the 
change in the quantity or quality of a resource is positive, and utility is held constant, compensating 
surplus, or WTP, measures the maximum amount of income a household will pay to receive this new 
benefit (Haab & McConnell, 2002:6)4.  Compensating surplus or WTP in the case of a standard tax can 
be modelled as follows (Bergstrom et al, 2004:2-4): 
 
Let u = u(X,Q,Z) be a household’s preference function, where u is a direct utility function positively 
related to X, Q and Z, and X = X1,…,Xm is a vector of private market goods.  Let Q be the public good 
under investigation, in this case a program of GM and non-GM food labelling and separation, to be 
simply referred to as the ‘labelling program.’  Z is a composite commodity of all other public goods, 
with the exception of the labelling program, with unit price and value equal to the tax charged to a 
household. 
 
Assume that all households maximise utility subject to the household budget constraint, M = PX + Z, 
where M is nominal income, and P is a price vector of private goods.  Note that a given household’s 
disposable income, Md = M-Z, is assumed to be spent entirely on purchasing market goods, PX.   
 
This utility maximisation problem yields a set of conditional household demand functions for the market 
goods, xi* (P,Q,Z,Md), which can be substituted into the direct utility function to derive a conditional 
indirect utility function: 
 
     u = v(P,Q,Z,Md)      (1). 
 
Inverting function (1) for Md yields the following conditional expenditure function, which defines the 
minimum expenditure on private goods required to produce utility level u, given P, Q and Z: 
 
     e* = Md = e*(P,Q,Z,u)      (2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
erroneous answers, given that these respondents claim they would reduce the amount of food purchased by significantly 
more than the amount of the tax.   
4 There are three other forms of welfare measures that can be calculated by a CV study.  For a full outline of welfare 
measures in CV see Bateman et al (2002). 
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To minimize total expenditures on both private and public goods subject to a utility level of u, the 
restricted expenditure function is required: 
 
     e = e(P,Q,Z,u)      (3). 
 
This function defines the total expenditure on both private and public goods required to achieve utility, 
u, given P, Q and Z, and is related to the conditional expenditure function as follows:  
 
     e = e(P,Q,Z,u) = e*(P,Q,Z,u) + Z     (4), 
 
where e is nominal income and e* is disposable income. 
 
The change in the labelling program can now be introduced through a change in Q.  Assume that 
without the program, perceived general food quality is Q0 and with the program it will improve to Q1 
where Q1>Q0, and the supply of other public goods is held constant at Z0.  If there is no change in 
nominal income, WTP for the labelling program is given by compensating surplus (CS), which can be 
calculated using the restricted and conditional expenditure functions: 
 
     CS = e(P,Q0,Z0,u0) – e(P,Q1,Z0,u0) 
     CS = [e*( P,Q0,Z0,u0) + Z0] - [e*( P,Q1,Z0,u0) + Z0] 
     CS = e*( P,Q0,Z0,u0) - e*( P,Q1,Z0,u0)    (5), 
 
where, u0 = v(P,Q0,Z0,Md0) is the utility level at which perceived food quality is at level Q0 before 
introduction of the labelling program, and Md0 = M- Z0. 
Bergstrom et al (2004:4) explain that in accordance with standard consumer demand theory, this 
magnitude, CS, for a change in Q equals the marginal rate of substitution between the labelling program 
and disposable income.  That is MRSQ,Md. 
 
2.3.2 Welfare Measure for a Tax Reallocation 
Instead of trading off household expenditure to obtain the improvement in the labelling program, the TR 
vehicle requires a household to trade-off Z, the composite commodity of other public goods.  To model 
this trade-off for the increase of Q0 to Q1, Bergstrom et al (2004:3) introduce a new welfare measure 
called the compensating tax reallocation (CTR).  Using the same notation as section 2.3.1 above, this 
measure can be calculated as follows: 
 
     CTR = e(P,Q0,Z0,u0) – e(P,Q1,Z1,u0)    (6). 
 
Given that under a TR, Md0 is equivalent for each of the right-hand side terms of (6), the conditional 
expenditure functions of each scenario are also equal.  That is: 
 
     e*( P,Q0,Z0,u0) = e*( P,Q1,Z1,u0)     (7). 
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Equation (6) can therefore be re-written using equation (4) as: 
 
     CTR = [e*(P,Q0,Z0,u0) + Z0] – [e*(P,Q1,Z1,u0) + Z1]  (8). 
 
And, equation (8) can be reduced to:  
 
     CTR = Z0 - Z1      (9). 
 
If equation (7) is then solved for Z1 by the following equation:  
 
    Z1 = Z1*( P,Q0, Q1,Z0,u0)      (10), 
 
then CTR can also be expressed as: 
 
     CTR = Z0 - Z1*( P,Q0, Q1,Z0,u0)     (11). 
 
As disposable income is held constant in the case of CTR, CTR is equal not to the marginal rate of 
substitution between the labelling program and income, but rather the marginal rate of substitution 
between the program and the composite commodity of all other public goods, MRSQ,Z.  If CTR is 
greater than CS, MRSQ,Z > MRSQ,Md, this therefore implies that a household prefers an increase in 
disposable income or private goods to an increase in all other public goods.  If CTR is less than CS it 
correspondingly implies the reverse, and a household will prefer an increase in its access to publicly-
provided goods and services.    
 
Bergstrom et al (2004:5) explain that the two compensating welfare measures derived above are largely 
determined by the relative marginal values of a household’s existing bundle of public and private goods. 
For example, if a household’s existing bundle of public goods has a high marginal value relative to 
private goods, perhaps because few public goods are currently provided, then CTR is likely to be less 
than CS.  The reverse will likely be true if a household lives in an area where there is already a large 
supply of valuable public goods.  This means that for a given jurisdiction, it is largely impossible to a 
priori predict the relative magnitudes of CTR and CS.   
 
The following case study will test for differences between CTR and CS for a GM and non-GM 
separation and labelling program in the UK. 
 
3 – THE CASE STUDY 
The case study used to test for differences between CTR and CS in this paper is a CV study conducted 
by CSERGE5 on the WTP in the UK for the labelling of GM and non-GM food.  Specifically, the survey 
asks households how much they would be WTP for a program that ensures all foods are separated, 
transported and inspected with their GM content clearly labelled.  
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This is an important and policy-relevant area of study given a large number of countries and the EU 
have adopted, or plan to adopt, mandatory labelling for GM food (Phillip & McNeill, 2000).  In the EU, 
of which the UK is a part, the first labelling requirements for GM foods were introduced in 1997 (Carter 
& Gruere, 2003:1).  These initial controls have been strengthened a number of times (Sheridan, 2001), 
most recently in April 2004, with a stringent traceability and labelling scheme.6 This type of labelling 
scheme is costly, and Noussair et al (2002:3) suggest that it is important to ensure that the spending on 
such a program is economically efficient. One way the economic efficiency can be examined is by 
comparing the cost of the required identity preservation systems and labelling regulations with an 
aggregate estimate of households’ WTP for the labelling of GM foods (Kaye-Blake et al, 2002:2).  
 
A number of valuation studies have previously examined GM-related issues however almost all of these 
examine the WTP a price premium for non-GM over GM foods, rather than for labelling per se.  This is 
an important distinction to make because research suggests that consumers may have strong desires for 
labelling even if they are not generally opposed to consuming GM foods (European Commission, 2000, 
Boccaletti & Moro, 2000).  A recent study by Kaye-Blake et al (2002) is an exception to this trend and 
investigates using a linked logit model, the WTP of New Zealand consumers for information on the GM 
status of their food.  Their findings indicate a significant aggregate WTP for labelling of NZ$285m per 
annum, that easily exceeds the estimated costs of the labelling requirements mandated by the Australia 
New Zealand Food Authority (Kaye-Blake et al, 2002:14).   
 
While their model had a fairly weak goodness-of-fit and a low level of predictive accuracy, Kaye-Blake 
et al’s results suggest that the demand for GM food labelling is affected by the same factors that affect 
the demand for non-GM food7.  For example, attitudinal variables were found to be just as important as 
economic or demographic factors (Kaye-Blake, 2002:14), consistent with the findings of McCluskey et 
al (2003) and Kaneko & Chern (2003). 
 
Specific factors which played a significant role in increasing the WTP for labelling in Kaye-Blake et 
al’s study included being female, more highly educated, in paid employment, consuming organic food, 
having some knowledge of biotechnology, and exhibiting little belief in the potential benefits of genetic 
engineering.  Those respondents less likely to pay for labelling were unemployed or retired, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
5 Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment based at the University of East Anglia.  See 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/. 
6 This scheme ensures GM products can be traced through the supply chain, and that any foods that contain GM are 
labelled if the GM material exceeds a 0.9% threshold (Food Standards Agency, 2003). 
7 For recent CV studies that examine the demand for non-GM food see McCluskey et al (2003) and Kaneko & Chern 
(2003).  Note that the demand for non-GM foods has also been addressed using experimental methods (see for example 
Lusk et al, 2001 & Huffman et al, 2002), and choice modelling techniques (see Burton & Pearse, 2002). A number of 
other relevant papers can be located on the websites http://www.agbioforum.org, and 
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr/.  
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agricultural occupations, price conscious, able to perceive benefits in GM technology and with strong 
negative or positive levels of trust in large food manufacturing companies (Kaye-Blake et al, 2002:12).   
 
Age and income were not included as independent variables, despite the fact that age is mentioned as a 
significant and negatively-signed explanatory factor in the demand for non-GM food, and that economic 
theory suggests income and WTP for labelling are likely to be positively correlated (Kaye-Blake et al, 
2002:3).  It should be noted however, that the effect of income on the demand for non-GM foods is 
largely inconclusive in empirical studies (Gamble et al, 2000), and was omitted in Kaye-Blake et al’s 
model due to a large number of non-responses and after some unsuccessful preliminary analysis (Kaye-
Blake et al, 2002:7).   
 
There are a number of other variables that have previously been suggested to have an impact on the 
WTP for non-GM food that are not considered by Kaye-Blake et al. These include variables that may 
have a negative impact on WTP such as confidence in government (Kaneko & Chern, 2003), and 
household size (Medenhall & Evenson, 2002), as well as those that may have a positive effect such as 
strong risk perceptions (Kaneko & Chern, 2003), food safety concerns (McCluskey et al, 2001; 
Grimsaud et al, 2003), ethical concerns, and the presence of children in the household (Kaneko & 
Chern, 2003).  To extend Kaye-Blake et al’s (2002) study, some of these omitted variables are examined 
in this paper, as discussed in Section 4. 
 
Kaye-Blake et al (2002:15) conclude their study by suggesting that their investigation cannot fully 
answer the question of whether the New Zealand labelling program is economically efficient.  This is 
because while their investigation examines GM food labelling in a general sense, it is likely that the 
costs of labelling and the WTP for labelling vary by product.  Indeed, the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit 
(2003: 41) explains in a recent report that public attitudes towards GM foods are complex.  They 
suggest that these attitudes, which are likely to influence the WTP for GM food labelling, vary markedly 
between GM crops and other GM foods, and between different types of GM produce and GM traits.  A 
number of CV studies confirm this suggestion and find evidence that the WTP a price premium for non-
GM food can vary substantially by product8.   
 
WTP values can also vary significantly between different countries9. Bredahl (2000) suggests that these 
cross-country variations result because attitudes towards GM are deeply embedded in more general 
nature and technology-based attitudes held by each country’s consumers. In the UK, consumers’ 
attitudes towards GM foods are relatively negative (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2003:41).  For 
example, Moon and Balasubramanian (2001) find that UK consumers are significantly more opposed to 
                                                          
8 For example, Chern & Kaneko (2003) find that the average WTP to avoid GM vegetable oil, cornflakes, salmon and 
GM-fed salmon are 41, 25, 88 and 62% respectively higher than base product prices.  Other studies that find differences 
between WTP for different products include McCluskey et al (2001) and Grimsrud et al (2002). 
9 For example, see Moon & Balasubramanian (2001), Chern et al (2002). 
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GM and more WTP a premium for non-GM foods than similar consumers in the United States.  
Meanwhile, Gaskell & Allum (2003:59) provide evidence that UK residents are more pessimistic about 
biotechnology than the majority of other European citizens, although there is some evidence this 
pessimism, along with a strong opposition to GM foods, may be slowly declining.   
 
In summary, it is expected that this paper will uncover a positive WTP amongst UK consumers for the 
labelling and separation of GM and non-GM foods.  This WTP is likely to be explained by a range of 
demographic, socioeconomic and attitudinal factors.  A product tax (PT) in the form of higher food 
prices would seem to be a credible and reasonable PV with which to assess this WTP, particularly as it 
is coercive and would appear to be directly linked to provision of the resource in question.  This PV, 
however, may not be entirely fair and equitable, due to the fact that even those consumers with no 
demand for food labelling are forced to contribute towards the program.  Kaye-Blake et al’s (2002) 
study on the WTP for food labelling uses a PV of higher food prices, as do the CV studies that examine 
the WTP for non-GM food.   
 
A TR may also be a feasible PV in this case study, particularly given that the government could decide 
at any point to fund the EU-mandated labelling program out of existing taxation revenues.  A TR 
vehicle would appear to have largely similar characteristics to imposing higher food prices, in that it 
seems reasonable and coercive, but has some chance of creating PV bias through limited fairness to 
respondents not concerned by the consumption of GM foods. In addition, either PV could generate 
additional PV bias if respondents do not trust food manufacturers, or the government to use or reallocate 
the total identified funds as promised.  
 
4 – DATA, VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data  
The source of data for the case study is a mail questionnaire that was administered to a cluster sample of 
2000 UK households in 2001 following a series of consultations, focus groups and pilot studies.10 The 
survey methodology followed best practice survey prescriptions11, and each survey included an 
information pack on the potential benefits and risks of GM foods so all respondents would have a 
reasonably equal footing in their understanding of the issues at stake. 
 
The survey uses a dichotomous-choice elicitation question12 to ask whether or not given a specified bid 
value, households are willing to vote for a program that ensures the GM content is clearly labelled on all 
                                                          
10 The valuation survey section can be found in Appendix A. The remainder can be found in Kontoleon et al (2002). 
11 For example, the survey closely adhered to the ‘Total Design Method’ of Dillman (2000) and recommendations of 
Mangiore (1999) to ensure sample representativeness and minimum non-response rates.  See Kontoleon (2002) for 
further survey methodology and sampling details. 
12 See Hanley et al (1997:389) for a discussion of different elicitation methods and the advantages and disadvantages of 
the dichotomous choice technique.  Note that the dichotomous choice technique is recommended by the NOAA panel 
on CV. 
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supermarket foods.  As part of this question, each household has an equal chance of being presented 
with one of 8 bid values, £1, £3, £5, £10, £15, £20, £30, or £40 for every £100 spent on supermarket 
food; and one of two PV scenarios, either a PT or a TR.  The latter split sample design provides data for 
measuring CS and CTR, and testing hypotheses about the effects of the two different PVs on WTP 
values.   
 
Faced with the valuation scenario in the survey, a household can vote for or against the labelling 
program, or as recommended by the NOAA guidelines, can elect a “don’t know” response (Haab & 
McConnell, 2002:21).  The “no” responses are divided into two types – a respondent can indicate that 
they are not willing to pay the bid but may be willing to pay a lower amount for the program, or 
alternatively that they are against the program in an absolute sense and would not be WTP anything for 
its introduction.  Those households who vote for the program are then asked how much food they would 
consume if the program were to go ahead, whilst those who vote against it in an absolute sense are 
prompted to explain the rationale behind their decision. 
 
The survey also contains questions about households’ food purchasing habits and environmental 
concerns.  These questions were developed after focus groups and extensive reviews of GM literature, 
and are useful sections from which to draw attitudinal variables.  Finally, the survey provides 
demographic information about households including respondent age, education, household size and 
income.   
 
From the 2000 surveys, 581 were available in a useable form.  This number reduced to 533 after using 
Microsoft Excel to account for a number of non-response problems.  Households that provided no 
answer to the valuation question were removed from the sample, as were those who did not respond to 
the attitudinal questions, or the gender and age questions.  Fifty respondents who did not provide 
income details were not removed from the sample given this high level of non-response.  Instead they 
were allocated the average monthly sample income of £2906.90, after imputation efforts proved 
unsuccessful13.  Of the remaining 533 responses, 285 are from the PT treatment, and 248 from the TR 
treatment.  Issues of non-response bias and sample representativeness are considered in Section 5.1. 
 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 The Dependent Variables 
For purposes of preliminary analysis and to examine the sensitivity of WTP values to alternative 
assumptions and methodologies in variable construction, four dependent variables (WTP1 – WTP4) 
were created in Excel from the survey data.  Each of these is a binary variable, and takes the value of 
one if a household is WTP the bid value presented, and takes the value of zero otherwise.  Construction 
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of each variable treats “yes” responses identically, but differs with respect to the treatment of “no” and 
“don’t know” responses. A summary of the dependent variables is presented in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: Dependent Variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
WTP1 Excludes “don’t know” responses. Takes the value of 1 for “yes” responses, and 
0 for “no” responses. 
WTP2 Excludes “don’t know” and absolute “no” responses. Takes the value of 1 for 
“yes” responses, and 0 for remaining “no” responses. 
WTP3 Takes the value of 1 for “yes” responses, and 0 for “no” and “don’t know” 
responses. 
WTP4 Excludes “don’t know,” indifferent and protest responses. Takes the value of 1 
for “yes” responses, and 0 for remaining “no” responses. 
 
The first dependent variable tested, WTP1, follows a common strategy of excluding “don’t know” 
responses to the valuation question (Garrod & Willis, 1999:188). As per Section 5.1, this would not 
appear to be too problematic in this case study, as the average characteristics of respondents excluded 
are not substantially different to those of the rest of the sample.  WTP1 then treats all “no’s” as zeros, 
regardless of the rationale that lies behind these responses. 
 
WTP2 is similar to WTP1 and excludes all “don’t know” responses, but differs to WTP1 by also 
excluding those households that indicate they are absolutely against the labelling program.  That is, 
those households who choose the second of the “no” response options.  This construction technique 
follows the recommendations of Haab and McConnell (2002:133) and Pearce (2003:13) by removing 
respondents who appear not WTP any amount for the program either for reasons of indifference or 
protest. 
 
WTP3 is constructed by allocating a zero value to all “no” and “don’t know” responses.  This is in 
response to Carson et al’s (1998) and Groothuis and Whitehead’s (1998) suggestion that the majority of 
respondents who answer “don’t know” to CV surveys would select “no” if instructed to make a more 
definitive choice. 
 
Finally, WTP4 expands on the construction of WTP2.  “Don’t know” responses are excluded as per 
WTP2, particularly given Wang’s (1997:220,224) claim that treating “don’t know” responses as “no’s” 
is unlikely to be a sound strategy in all situations and may result in significant underestimation of WTP 
values.  However, rather than immediately excluding what appear to be indifferent and protest 
responses, the WTP4 variable is constructed by more carefully examining the rationale behind these 
absolute “no” responses.  In particular, households who indicate they are against the labelling program, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
13 An OLS model designed to predict income values for households with missing values was found to be a very weak fit 
with an overall explanatory R2 of only 0.9%.  This may be due to the lack of an occupational or employment variable in 
the model. 
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but explain that this is because the bid amount is too high, are included amongst the “no” respondents 
who initially indicate that they may support the program at some lower amount.  Households that are 
against the program because they believe someone else should pay the cost, require more information to 
make a decision, or fail to provide a reason, are excluded from the sample and set aside as protest 
responses.  Note that those households who believe someone else such as the GM food companies, non-
GM food consumers, or in the case of the PT, the government, should pay for the labelling program, 
provide some evidence of PV bias.  Finally, those households who indicate they are not worried about 
GM food, or believe that the funds should be spent on other public services, which may also indicate 
little concern for the impacts of GM, are treated as indifferent respondents.  These households are 
excluded from econometric models, but are used to adjust WTP values, as per Haab and McConnell 
(2002:136) to accommodate for the fact that parts of the UK public may be indifferent towards the 
consumption and accordingly the identification of GM foods. 
 
Initial estimation and analysis on the determinants of the WTP decision is conducted using a series of 
models with each of the four dependent variables.  Given results are quite similar across the models in 
terms of magnitude and sign, this paper largely focuses on those models using WTP4.  WTP4 is chosen 
as its construction makes intuitive sense, and it makes the greatest use of the information contained in 
the survey responses.  WTP4 is also used to calculate WTP values in order to test the PV hypotheses to 
be found in Section 4.3, although these values are also calculated using the alternative WTP variables in 
order to examine sensitivity to variable construction.   
 
4.2.2 The Independent Variables 
The independent variables to be used in estimation are those demographic and attitudinal items included 
in the survey, which the analysis in Section 3 indicated might have a significant influence on the WTP 
decision. These variables are summarized in Table 2. Before examining these variables, however, the 
bid price variable deserves considerable attention.  This variable, BIDPR, is the first and potentially 
most important variable included in the econometric models and takes the value of the particular bid 
presented to each household participating in the study.  BIDPR is expected to have a significant and 
negative impact on the WTP decision.  That is, as the bid value increases to higher amounts, households 
are less likely to be WTP for the labelling program under investigation.  BIDPR is an important variable 
as it is included both in general models examining the determinants of WTP, as well as specific models 
that calculate WTP values for each PV sample. 
 
Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables examined in the WTP models include gender, age, education, income, number 
of children in the household and total household size.  After preliminary analysis all demographic 
variables except age, income and household size, are constructed as dummy variables as per the 
definitions in Table 2.  The age and income variables are constructed by allocating each respondent with 
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the midpoint of their elected age or monthly income bracket, with missing income values replaced by 
the average sample income as outlined in Section 4.1. 
 
TABLE 2: Independent Variables 
VARIABL
E 
DEFINITION 
BIDPR Takes the value of the presented bid price - £1, £3, £5, £10, £15, £20, £30, 
or £40 
GENDER Takes a value of 1 for male respondents 
AGE The midpoint of the respondents age bracket 
EDU Takes a value of 1 if a respondent has a university degree or professional 
qualification 
INCOME The midpoint of the respondents income bracket 
CHILD Takes a value of 1 if the household contains any children aged 16 or under 
HHOLD The total number of household members 
F1 Ethical Resistance – represents high scores in survey questions that 
indicate resistance to GM foods on ethical grounds 
F2 Mistrust and Disbelief - represents high scores in survey questions that 
reflect a sense of mistrust with food standards and in the policies and 
practices of government, scientific and agricultural-industry bodies, as 
well as a lack of faith in the ability of humans to overcome any particular 
risks involved in the use of biotechnology 
F3 Environmental Concerns - represents high scores in survey questions that 
indicate a strong pro-environment mind-set 
F4 Cost and Bargain Concerns - represents high scores in survey questions 
that reflect a high level of price sensitivity 
F5 Food Safety Concerns - represents high scores in survey questions that 
indicate high levels of concern with general food safety 
 
In line with the results of previous studies, GENDER, AGE, EDU and HHOLD are expected to have a 
negative impact on the WTP decision, while the coefficient of CHILD is expected to be positive.  
Consistent with economic theory, INCOME is also expected to have a positive sign in the PT sample, 
although this has not consistently proved to be a significant variable in GM-related valuation studies.  
The INCOME variable in the tax reallocation sample has no strict a priori expectation, although if 
Bergstrom et al’s (2004) study is indicative, the income variable is likely to be insignificant and 
negative.  While Bergstrom et al (2004) do not explore the reasons behind this negative sign, it may 
make intuitive sense in this paper’s case study.  This is because poorer households pay less of the total 
tax revenues that would be used to fund the labelling program and may therefore be anxious for the 
reallocation mechanism to be used rather than having to face higher product prices that would impact 
upon them in a disproportionately large manner.  This may make poor households more likely to agree 
to higher bid values under the TR scenario, especially as the TR version of the survey makes reference 
to the fact that under the alternative situation of higher prices, lower income households are particularly 
adversely affected. 
 
 16
Unfortunately, the survey data does not include occupation variables, which were found to be significant 
indicators of WTP in Kaye-Blake et al’s (2002) study, or locational variables.  The latter may be a 
useful determinant of WTP under the TR scenario as different areas are likely to display varying 
bundles of public goods, with the households in these areas consequently placing varying marginal 
values on increases in publicly-provided services. 
 
Attitudinal Variables 
A number of attitudinal and behavioural questions are available in the survey from which to construct 
additional explanatory variables.  For the purposes of this paper, however, five previously constructed 
latent variables are used to analyse the impact of attitudes on the WTP for labelling decision.  These 
variables were created using factor analysis14 on 37 likert-scale questions in the survey, and are useful 
because they can effectively capture similarly-themed attitudes within the same variable, rather than 
including large numbers of separate variables, which might potentially lead to problems with 
multicollinearity or specification error.  In addition, this methodology ensures reasonable accuracy 
given that the data on the raw attitudinal variables is somewhat unclear because it has been manipulated 
to complete the factor analysis. 
 
The five latent variables quite comprehensively cover the range of attitudes that might impact upon the 
WTP for labelling decision, and are included with their descriptions in Table 2.  Following previous 
findings F1, F2 and F5 might be expected to have a positive sign, whilst F4 is expected to have a 
negative one. F3 might reasonably be either positive or negative, depending on whether households see 
GM as risky or beneficial for the environment.  The coefficient signs on the latent variables also might 
vary between the 2 different PV samples if the impact of attitudes on the WTP under a TR differs to that 
previously investigated under the standard PT or price rise.  
 
4.3 Estimation Methodology 
This paper follows the approach of Cameron and James (1987) and directly estimates WTP models15.  
These models are estimated for each of the PV scenarios using the probit technique16. All models are 
estimated in the LIMDEP econometrics package using the maximum likelihood method. 
 
To analyse the determinants of whether or not households are WTP for the labelling program, the 
following binomial probit equation is used: 
                                                          
14 See Kontoleon (2002) for a detailed description of the latent variable construction. Factor analysis is a statistical 
technique that is commonly used to isolate the factors underlying respondents’ answers to a series of questions.  In 
essence, factor analysis finds underlying commonalities in responses (Teisl et al, 2003:8).  See Kontoleon (2002) and 
Nunes (2002) for more details. 
15 Another common alternative follows the approach of Hanemann.  See Hanemann & Kanninen (1998). 
16 Note that the logit specification could have equally been used to produce highly comparable results (Gujarati, 
1995:554). 
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Where Φ is the notation for the standard normal distribution, and Xk are the explanatory variables 
discussed in Section 4.2.  
 
To calculate average household WTP, this paper estimates probit models containing solely the 
dependent variable, constant and bid price.  Three such parametric models are estimated and discussed, 
each involving a different transformation of BIDPR. In order to examine the sensitivity of the WTP 
values to the parametric distribution assumptions, a fourth WTP value is also calculated as per Bateman 
et al (2002) and Haab and McConnell (2002), using the non-parametric Turnbull method.  Once the 
WTP values are calculated, Thaye’s two-tailed t-test (Larson, 1982) is used to test the following PV 
hypothesis at the 95% confidence level: 
 
     H0: WTPPT = WTPTR;       H1: WTPPT ≠ WTPTR, 
 
Where WTPPT is the mean WTP of a household under the PT scenario and WTPTR is the mean WTP of 
a household when faced with a TR.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected this provides evidence that 
WTP values are not statistically different under the two PVs.  That is, CTR is equal to CS and a 
household equally prefers an increase in disposable income or private goods to an increase in all other 
public goods.  If the null is rejected, it alternatively indicates that CTR and CS diverge, suggesting 
differences in the marginal values of public and private goods.   
 
5 – ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Before examining the estimation results from the probit models, it is informative to analyse the 
summary statistics for the sample of respondents.  Table B1 of Appendix B presents the means and 
standard deviations of the household-specific variables, and also provides statistics by the two PV 
treatments.17 Thaye’s t-test is used to compare the means of each variable between these 2 treatments, 
and the null hypothesis that the means are equal cannot be rejected.  It is important that the means of 
these demographic and attitudinal variables are similar to avoid complicating the PV hypothesis testing.  
Johansson (1999:14) explains that if variables are significantly different across the sub-samples, it is 
difficult to tell whether a hypothesis test result is reliable, rather than due to some systematic difference 
in household characteristics.   
 
In order to assess the potential bias from omitting certain categories of respondents, average sample 
characteristics of households included in the construction of each WTP variable are compared against 
households who are excluded.  These are also compared, where possible, against characteristics of 
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respondents omitted from the sample of 533 households.  The results for WTP4 are contained in Table 
B2.  It can be seen that the mean characteristics across the first two groups of households are 
comparable, suggesting that the WTP4 sample is largely representative of the total useable sample 
under investigation.  The characteristics of the sample originally excluded however, vary more widely, 
suggesting some level of non-response bias.  This level of bias is difficult to determine conclusively, 
given that the means in this third sample were calculated using limited data with a number of missing 
values.  Weighting procedures could be used to adjust the retained sample if it is believed to be 
unrepresentative of the whole (Bateman et al, 2002:5.38), however this approach is not taken here given 
the unavailability of information on true full sample or population characteristics.   
 
5.2 Results of the WTP Model 
LIMDEP is used to estimate initial runs of the probit models18 using the four dependent variables in 
each PV scenario, with the independent variables described in Table 2.  Both on goodness-of-fit grounds 
and the grounds of individual parameter effects, results across the models are reasonably comparable. 
For example, pseudo R2 values across the four PT models vary between 18.52% and 20.34%, while 
those for the TR models are between 10.79% and 12.54%.  The BIDPR variable has a significant and 
negative impact on WTP in all models, while the remaining explanatory variables are consistently 
signed across the models for each PV scenario. 
 
For reasons discussed in Section 4.2.1, and on the basis of slight statistical superiority, this paper 
focuses largely on the results of the WTP4 models.  Table B3 of Appendix B presents the initial results 
of the WTP4 models, while Table 3 presents the results following exploration and testing of some 
alternative specifications.  In particular, the models in Table 3 include an age-squared term, AGESQ, to 
investigate how the WTP decision varies with the rate of change in age, as well as the natural log of the 
income variable, LINCOME.  On suggestion of Bateman et al (2002:5.18) all variables are retained in 
the models.  This is regardless of their significance and allows for a full comparison and discussion of 
the covariate effects under each PV scenario. 
 
TABLE 3: Estimation Results 
VARIABLE ST 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
P-value 
TR 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
P-value 
Constant 0.1827 0.7313 0.5024 0.3299 
BIDPR -0.0211 0.0000** -0.0100 0.0057** 
GENDER -0.0331 0.6861 0.0356 0.4050 
AGE -0.0315 0.0465** -0.0300 0.0692* 
AGESQ 0.0004 0.0136** 0.0003 0.0620* 
EDU -0.0729 0.3789 -0.0710 0.4145 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
17 Note that for ease of interpretation, the means of CHILD and EDU are given using continuous variables rather than 
the dummies used in estimation.  
18 See Appendix C for an excerpt of the final LIMDEP command file 
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LINCOME 0.0840 0.0880* 0.0279 0.5711 
CHILD 0.0400 0.7134 0.0012 0.9921 
HHOLD -0.0043 0.9060 0.0335 0.3984 
F1 0.0885 0.0319** 0.1797 0.0000** 
F2 0.1191 0.0112** 0.0776 0.0936* 
F3 0.0294 0.5348 0.0868 0.0755* 
F4 -0.0695 0.1717 0.0622 0.2375 
F5 -0.0875 0.0904* 0.0361 0.5030 
Pseudo R2 
Test 
significance 
∼X2 
Prob > X2 
Prediction 
Success 
22.35% 
 
62.7678 
0.0000 
 
73.40% 
 13.72% 
 
33.6505 
0.0014 
 
66.10% 
 
** Significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
5.2.1 Testing the WTP Model 
Before discussing the results of the models in Table 3, it is important to examine the overall goodness-
of-fit of the models19. In assessing this fit there are several summary statistics for the probit specification 
that can be examined. These are set out in Table 3 and suggest that the PT model has a somewhat 
superior fit to the TR model.  The first statistic is McFadden’s pseudo R2, which is calculated as 1-
(Lmax/L0), where Lmax is the value of the unrestricted loglikelihood function, and L0 is the value of the 
function when all slope coefficients are set equal to zero. Considerable care needs to be taken when 
interpreting this statistic which has values of 22.35% for the PT model and 13.72% for the TR model.  
This is because there is no commonly accepted value for pseudo R2 that denotes a satisfactory or well-
defined model (Hanemann & Kanninen, 1998:344); although higher values are preferred and any value 
in single figures suggests WTP values show little in the way of distinguishable patterns (Bateman et al, 
2002:5.18).   
 
An alternative and preferable measure of fit is the X2 test statistic also found in Table 3.  This statistic, 
which corresponds to the F-statistic in linear regression, by testing whether all slope coefficients are 
equal to 0, has calculated and p values of 62.77 and 0.0000, and 33.65 and 0.0014, for the PT and TR 
models respectively, suggesting that both models as a whole are statistically significant.  
 
From a summary point of view, it is also worthwhile to report the predictive success of the models, 
where a prediction, P, is correct when Pj > 0.5 and Yj = 1, or Pj ≤ 0.5 and Yj = 0, and where Yj is the 
observed WTP decision equal to one when an individual chooses to vote for the labelling program 
(Fomby et al, 1988:352).  A classification table indicating the predicted and observed values of WTP4, 
                                                          
19 Note that given the scope of this paper, and the complexity of the testing and corrective procedures required, it is 
assumed that the basic assumptions of the probit model hold.  Details on probit model assumptions, and testing and 
correcting for these assumptions can be found in Aldrich and Nelson (1984), Maddala (1983) and Greene (1993).  
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is presented in Appendix C.  Results suggest that both models are fair predictors of the WTP decision 
with 73.40% and 66.10% of cases in the PT and TR samples correctly classified. 
 
5.2.2 Discussion of WTP Model Results 
The estimation results in Table 3 are generally consistent with previous empirical findings and/or make 
intuitive sense, suggesting that the internal validity of the study is sound.  In particular, the BIDPR 
variable is negative and significant in both models and the estimated coefficients for the remaining 
variables while not always significant have with only limited exception, the expected signs.   
 
The AGE and AGESQ coefficients are negative and positive respectively, suggesting older respondents 
are less likely to be WTP for GM labelling at an increasing rate.  These variables are significant at the 
5% level in the PT model and at 10% for the case of the TR.  In both models EDU is negatively, but 
insignificantly related to the WTP decision, while having a child has a positive impact.  As expected, the 
coefficient on household size has a negative sign in the PT model, although this variable is also 
insignificant.  The HH variable is insignificant and positive in the TR model, perhaps because the 
alternative option of paying higher food prices is more threatening to households with larger numbers of 
members and thereby higher levels of food expenditure.  Contrary to expectations, GENDER has a 
positive coefficient in the PT model, but as per the TR model, this variable is highly insignificant. 
 
Finally, in line with economic theory, LINCOME has a positive and significant impact on the WTP for 
labelling decision in the case of a PT, but is insignificant in the TR scenario.  The coefficient of 
LINCOME in the TR model is positive in contrast to Bergstrom et al’s (2004) findings, but given its 
small magnitude and high level of insignificance, this paper’s results support their suggestion that 
welfare effects measured by a TR are not influenced by nominal income. As Bergstrom et al (2004:12) 
explain, this may be a desirable result from a social justice perspective, and while this is not true of this 
case study, may be particularly useful in evaluating policies that provide benefits to richer households 
while imposing costs on the poor.  
 
The models presented in this paper also suggest that attitudinal variables are important in determining 
the WTP for labelling decision, with three significant variables in each of the two models.  In the PT 
model F1 and F2 are positive and significant, indicating as expected, that households with higher ethical 
resistance to GM and mistrust in the institutions involved in biotechnology are more likely to be WTP 
for GM labelling.  F3 and F4 are insignificant but consistent with expectations, while F5 is surprisingly 
negative and significant.  This latter result suggests that high levels of food safety concerns decrease the 
likelihood of a household being WTP for labelling.  It is unclear why this might be the case, although 
perhaps food safety-conscious households may for example, see the potential for GM to improve 
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nutritional value as outweighing any possible adverse health risks, and as a result are not WTP an 
additional premium for labelling.   
 
In the TR model, F1 and F2 are positive and significant as per the PT model, as is F3 which indicates 
strong environmental concerns.  As expected F5 has a positive impact on the WTP decision, however it 
is highly insignificant.  Finally F4, while insignificant is also positive, suggesting that households with 
strong cost and bargain concerns are more likely to be WTP for labelling under a TR scenario.  This 
may reflect these households being more likely to agree to their allocated bid values under the TR 
model, because this involves reallocation of their existing taxation payments rather than having to pay 
additional funds as per the alternative scenario. 
 
It should be noted this paper is somewhat limited to using the attitudinal variables as defined by a 
previous survey analysis.  To more fully investigate the impact of different attitudes and behaviours on 
the WTP decision, it is recommended that further investigation with different types and forms of these 
variables take place.   
 
5.3 Calculation of WTP and Hypothesis Testing 
5.3.1 Calculation of Average Household WTP 
This section of the paper follows Vaughan et al (1999) and Crooker and Herriges (2004), in calculating 
a range of central tendency estimates for household WTP.  Russell (2001:179) explains that with a 
simple dichotomous-choice survey, it is possible to choose among approximately twelve methods for 
inferring WTP.  Each of these methods generally produces a different measure of central tendency 
which can differ by several magnitudes to other measures, with often no particular measure so obviously 
superior that the others can be rejected (Russell, 2001:179, Vaughan et al, 1999:7).  In this paper three 
common parametric estimates are compared and contrasted in order to examine the sensitivity of these 
estimates to the underlying distribution of preferences and the estimation procedures employed20.  In 
addition, a non-parametric model is employed to produce a mean WTP estimate that is robust against 
potential distributional mis-specification (Kristrom, 1990:138).   
 
The first parametric model investigated is the linear probit model.  Following Cameron and James 
(1987) and Hanemann and Kanninen (1998), a probit regression containing a constant and the BIDPR 
variable is implemented and the estimates recovered.  The coefficients on the constant and BIDPR, α 
and β, represent point estimates of µ⁄σ and –1/σ respectively, and allow the mean WTP, µ, to be quickly 
recovered.  Given the symmetry property of the normal distribution, µ is also equal to the median 
household WTP (Buckland et al, 1999:110).  The first column of Table 4 contains estimates of 
                                                          
20 Note that Bateman et al (2002:5.19) explain that the best-fitting model when covariates are included does not have to 
make the same distributional assumptions as those used in a parametric model used to evaluate mean and median WTP. 
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mean/median WTP under the linear probit model for the WTP4 models, as well as the models using the 
three alternative dependent variables21.  
 
TABLE 4: Mean and Median WTP Values 
Variable Linear 
Mean / 
Median 
Log 
(BIDPR) 
Mean 
Log 
(BIDPR) 
Median 
Bound 
Median 
Turnbull 
Mean 
WTP4 – PT £11.98 £116.56 £7.21 £9.06 £11.74 
WTP4 – TR £11.91 £8660.52 £7.44 £10.90 £11.27 
WTP1 – PT £5.59 £88.16 £3.77 £3.42 £10.18 
WTP1 – TR -£3.69 £92,394.12 £2.15 £1.07 £9.61 
WTP2 – PT £12.77 £111.80 £7.97 £10.31 £12.57 
WTP2 – TR £12.22 £11,290.78 £7.60 £11.35 £11.49 
WTP3 – PT £2.69 £85.60 £2.76 £2.68 £8.80 
WTP3 – TR -£8.23 £11,661.73 £1.59 £0.81 £8.43 
 
Note that while the calculated values under WTP4 and WTP2 are similar both between the two PV 
scenarios and to each other, the values under WTP1 and WTP3 are quite different, and in particular, the 
values under the TR scenarios are negative.  Indeed, negative WTP results can occur in linear models 
despite no negative bids being offered.  Haab and McConnell (2002:94) explain that this is because the 
symmetry of the normal distribution places an equal mass of the distribution above and below the mean.  
In the case of the TR models utilising WTP1 and WTP3, there are a large number of “no” responses to 
the low bids in the sample data22, which causes the linear model to put a large mass in the negative WTP 
region and produce negative estimates of expected WTP.  According to Haab and McConnell 
(2002:85,96) in situations where it is unreasonable for mean WTP to be negative, the probable cause of 
negative WTP values is functional form, or the bid price structure.  That is, the set of bid values may fail 
to elicit responses that accurately trace out the probability that an individual will pay a given amount23.  
In this case study, a negative WTP value in the TR scenario would appear to be unreasonable, because it 
suggests that households would like to reduce the current share of the tax budget that goes to a GM 
labelling program.  However, as this program is not currently funded by taxation revenues, this 
particular share of the tax budget is non-existent and therefore cannot be reduced.   
 
To ensure average household WTP is a non-negative value for all models, the second of the parametric 
methodologies is used.  This technique assumes that the relationship between WTP and the bid price is 
log-linear, and estimates a simple regression model, replacing BIDPR with LBIDPR, the natural log of 
the BIDPR variable.  In essence, this technique transforms the bid variable so that negative values of 
                                                          
21 Following model estimation in LIMDEP, all WTP values were calculated using Excel. 
22 In WTP1 and WTP3 52% and 55% of respondents respectively, respond “no” to bids equal to or less than £5.  This is 
in comparison to a figure of 41% for WTP2 and WTP4.   
23 There are a number of ways to remedy this problem in the questionnaire design phase.  See Haab and McConnell 
(2002) for further details.   
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WTP are impossible24 (Buckland et al, 1999:111).  Under this methodology the recovered estimates of 
µ⁄σ and –1/σ are used to calculate mean and median WTP using the following formulae (Haab and 
McConnell, 2002): 
     Mean WTP = 
2
2
1σµ+
e ;      Median WTP =  µe
The calculated WTP results of this technique can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.  Note that the 
mean WTP values are significantly larger than those under the linear models, particularly in the case of 
the TR scenario.  This reflects the “fat tails” problem, whereby unrealistically large estimates of mean 
WTP result from models that bound WTP from below (Haab & McConnell, 2002:92).  Buckland et al 
(1999:111) explain that while the log transformation might adequately resolve the difficulty of fitting 
the lower tail of the WTP curve, it can create an even greater difficulty in the upper tail.  That is, by 
restricting WTP to be positive, this technique forces too large a proportion of mass in the upper tail of 
the WTP distribution and can give rise to absurdly high estimates of WTP (Buckland et al, 1999:112, 
Haab & McConnell, 2002:95).  This is particularly true of the TR models where there are a large 
number of “yes” responses to the highest bid value25, resulting in the log-linear model assigning large 
amounts of weight to the WTP values in the upper tail of the distribution. 
   
One way to avoid the “fat tails” problem is to use the median WTP value of the log-linear model.  The 
median is a more robust measure of central tendency as it is largely unaffected by high bids in the upper 
tail of the distribution (Garrod & Willis, 1999:139, Jacobsson & Dragun, 1996:105).  Furthermore, 
according to Garrod and Willis (1999:139) it is a useful measure because it indicates the amount of 
money which a one-person–one-vote system would allocate to the policy in question.  A disadvantage of 
the median however, is that it is unsuitable for aggregating WTP values across populations (Mitchell 
&Carson, 1989:197), and so cannot be used to estimate the total WTP for GM labelling across the UK. 
 
An alternative remedy to the “fat tails” problem is to identify a transformation variable that removes the 
probability of the range of WTP in the lower tail, but does not significantly alter the behaviour of the 
upper tail26 (Buckland et al, 1999:112).  For example, Haab and McConnell (1997:17) suggest that in 
most cases WTP is bounded below by zero and above by income, and recommend that these bounds be 
incorporated into estimating and calculating central tendencies of WTP. This paper follows Haab and 
McConnell’s approach by creating a new bounded bid variable, BOUND equal to ]ln[
i
ii
BIDPR
BIDPRY −
, 
                                                          
24 An alternative technique is to estimate the linear model and then truncate the curve at 0 when calculating WTP.  This 
method, however, is not recommended as it is seen to be theoretically inconsistent and arbitrary.  See Buckland et al 
(1999:111) and Haab and McConnell (1996:15). 
25 The % of households responding “yes” to the highest bid of £40 are 11.5, 15.8, 10.3 and 8.7% in the PT models for 
WTP1, WTP2, WTP3 and WTP4 respectively, compared to very high values of 35.3, 42.9, 31.6 and 42.9% in the TR 
models. Ideally these %s at the highest bid value should be close to 0. 
26 Rather than identifying a transformation variable, truncation can also be used following estimation to truncate the 
upper portion of the WTP curve.  However, similarly to truncating at 0, this is not the recommended approach. 
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where Yi is the ith household’s calculated annual income, and BIDPRi is the bid value offered to 
household i27.   By estimating this model and retaining the coefficients µ⁄σ and –1/σ, on the constant and 
BOUND variables respectively, median household WTP can be calculated using the following equation 
(Haab & McConnell, 2002): 
     Median WTP = 
)1( µe
Y
+  
Where Y is equal to average sample annual income.  The values of the median household WTP using 
the bounded model are found in column 4 of Table 4, and are similar to those from the linear and 
log(BIDPR) median models, with the exception of the TR values in WTP1 and WTP3.  The median is 
chosen as the measure of central tendency for the bounded model given its simple closed-form solution.  
Calculation of mean WTP under this model is more complicated because of the non-linear nature of the 
error disturbance in the assumed form of WTP (Haab & McConnell, 1997:3,4). 
  
Finally, to examine the effect of potential model mis-specification on the estimates of the welfare 
measures, the parametric measures of central tendency are compared to those derived from a non-
parametric model.  Hanemann and Kanninen (1998:402) explain that calculating mean WTP measures 
using a non-parametric model is useful as this type of model is more robust against possible mis-
specification of the response probability distribution and offers the least restricted characterisation of 
“what the data have to say.”28  This paper calculates mean WTP values using the lower-bound Turnbull 
method29 as set out by Haab and McConnell (1996) and Vaughan and Rodriguez (2000).  This method 
uses the proportion of “no” responses at each bid value to provide a discrete stepwise approximation to 
the WTP cumulative distribution function.  As per Table 4, the non-parametric estimates of mean WTP 
are very similar to those values derived under the linear model for WTP2 and WTP4, suggesting that 
these models are the least prone to potential mis-specification. 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis Testing 
It can be seen in Section 5.3.1 that calculated WTP values are sensitive to the dependent variable’s 
method of construction.  In addition, different functional forms of the WTP models seem to result in 
different central tendency estimates of household WTP.  Mitchell and Carson (1989:194) suggest that 
where there is no clear statistical or theoretical grounds for preferring one specification over another, 
reliability requires that the resulting welfare estimates should be similar.  This is largely true of the 
models using the preferred WTP4 dependent variable, with the exception of the mean calculated under 
the log (BIDPR) model.  In order to test the PV hypothesis of Section 4.3, the mean WTP values 
                                                          
27 Note that the largest sample bid or some other limiting value could have also been used instead of income. 
28 Note that a potential disadvantage of using non-parametric measures is that they only allow limited exploration of the 
effects of covariates on average WTP measures (Haab & McConnell, 2002:83).  This is not a problem in this paper 
given the simplified models used to estimate WTP values.   
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derived from the linear WTP4 models are used.  This is because these models display higher goodness-
of-fit statistics than the alternative functional forms30, and appear to have the least mis-specification 
error upon comparison to the non-parametric estimates.  In addition, Crooker and Herriges (2004:468) 
provide evidence that the simple linear probit specification performs consistently well in estimating 
mean WTP regardless of the true distribution under consideration. 
 
To test the null hypothesis that the WTP under the two PV scenarios is equal, standard errors for each 
model are calculated following Cameron and James (1987), and Thaye’s t-test is undertaken as detailed 
in Appendix D.  The hypothesis test indicates a calculated t value of 0.1841, which when compared to 
the critical value of 1.960, suggests that the null hypothesis of an equal mean WTP between the two PVs 
cannot be rejected. To adjust this hypothesis test to allow for indifferent respondents, this paper follows 
Haab and McConnell’s (2002:136) methodology31, also outlined in Appendix D.  After accounting for 
those households in the survey that appear indifferent towards the GM labelling program, mean WTP 
values adjust slightly downwards to £10.95 and £10.65 for the PT and TR models respectively.   Using 
Buckland et al’s (1999:113) formula for calculating the standard errors of these new means, the results 
of the second hypothesis test also indicate that the null hypothesis of equal mean WTP between the two 
PVs cannot be rejected.   
 
6 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 
The empirical results of this paper are generally consistent with previous biotechnology-related 
valuation studies, and find that the WTP for GM labelling is affected by price, demographic and 
attitudinal variables.  More specifically, the results indicate a WTP for GM labelling of £10.95 and 
£10.65 respectively under PT and TR payment mechanisms.  These figures, per £100 expenditure on 
supermarket food, suggest that UK households are WTP an implicit premium of almost 11% for food 
labelling either through higher food prices or reduced provision of alternative public goods. 
 
Using simple benefits transfer and an estimate of £49,615 million of annual UK supermarket food 
expenditure (Information Resources, 2004), an approximate yearly benefit of a GM labelling scheme of 
$5458 million can be calculated.  This annual figure easily exceeds an estimated twenty year present 
value program cost of £1594 million32 (Jones et al, 2001), suggesting that the implementation of a food 
labelling program is economically efficient. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
29 Other available non-parametric techniques include Kristrom’s intermediate-bound measure and Paasche’s upper-
bound measure.  See Vaughan and Rodriguez (2000) for further details. 
30 For example, the X2 statistics for the linear PT and TR models are 29.2416 and 5.5082 respectively, in comparison to 
values of 23.3277 and 4.9889 for the bound probit models. 
31 Note that other possible methods for allowing for indifferent respondents include the spike and mixture models.  See 
Buckland et al (1999) for further details and references. 
32 In 2001 prices. 
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Given that the mean WTP between the two PVs is not statistically significantly different, a food 
labelling program would be almost equally efficient whether funded out of a new product tax or from 
existing taxation revenues.  The equality between these two WTP measures is an interesting and 
valuable contribution to the CV literature, because as discussed in the following section, this is not a 
finding consistent with the previous research in this area. 
 
6.2 PV Discussion and Implications for CV 
Indeed, a finding of equal mean WTP between the two PVs is in stark contrast to Bergstrom et al’s 
(2004) findings in their dichotomous-choice survey where the mean WTP under a TR was found to be 
almost eighteen times higher than that under a standard tax.  This is not entirely unexpected, however, 
as Bergstrom et al (2004:12) explain that their case study results cannot easily be generalized to other 
populations, regions and public versus private good institutional settings.  This is because the relative 
marginal values of private goods and other public goods are conditional upon existing bundles of these 
goods, as well as the specific public goods included in the TR payment mechanism.  The results of this 
paper therefore suggest that these factors are likely to be markedly different between the two case 
studies under consideration. 
 
In the case study investigated here, it would appear that given existing bundles of public and private 
goods in the UK regions, combined with the preferences of the households living in these areas, 
respondents are equally willing to trade-off other government-funded goods for the labelling program as 
they are to trade-off private goods or their own disposable income.  That is, CS = CTR, which implies 
that a researcher estimating WTP for a GM labelling program in these areas could largely rely on the 
results from a traditional CV study using a PT PV, even if the funding for this program were to actually 
come from a reallocation of existing taxation funds.   
 
The findings of this paper further suggest that the marginal values of income/private goods, and the 
marginal value of other public goods are considerably more equal in the UK than they are in the US 
regions of Maine and Georgia, where the marginal value of income/private goods appears significantly 
higher.  These differences might be due to the US areas having access to a relatively better supply of 
public goods, or alternatively due to households in the UK regions having relatively higher incomes or 
larger bundles of private goods.  Of course, these differences may not in actual fact be real, as it is likely 
to be how a household perceives its current bundles of private and public goods that determines how it 
makes its trade-offs.  For example, UK households may not necessarily have relatively larger bundles of 
private goods than US households, but perhaps may be more content with the bundles they have, 
thereby displaying relatively lower marginal values for increases in the magnitude of these goods.  
 
It is not clear what impact the choice of policy evaluated might have on the relative values of the 
alternative welfare measures, given that the two case studies consider different types of programs.  For 
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example, it might be that households in the US may be relatively more willing to trade off their own 
income/private goods if they view a labelling program as more valuable than a ground water quality 
one.  This aspect requires further attention and could be addressed by undertaking studies in different 
jurisdictions using programs that provide similar benefits to the households in question.   
 
Note that the survey in this paper follows Bergstrom et al’s (2004) approach by referring in the TR 
question to a generic bundle of “other public services,” though Bergstrom et al (2004:16) do provide 
respondents with examples of “roads and bridges, schools, parks, police protection, health care, etc.” 
This may affect the results of our study given that the choice of the bundle of public goods to be traded-
off for the labelling program will influence the relative marginal values of public and private goods and 
therefore the relative magnitudes of CTR and CS.   
 
Bergstrom et al (2004:13) suggest that while using a general bundle of all other public goods may be 
interpreted somewhat vaguely by respondents, it is effective as it reduces the likelihood of a 
respondent’s valuation being overly influenced or biased by their feelings about one particular public 
good.  However, for more reliable valuation results, despite the possibility of some potential biases, it 
may be more accurate to use the particular bundle of public goods to be actually traded-off in order to 
fund the policy in question.  That is, if the labelling program in this paper actually were to be funded by 
existing government revenues, it would be useful for policy evaluation purposes to re-run this survey 
once the source of these particular funds has been identified.   
 
In conclusion, the TR payment mechanism investigated in this paper presents a number of interesting 
issues for traditional CV literature.  In particular, while our GM case study provides evidence that the 
welfare measure under a TR is equivalent to that under a more traditional PT PV, this is not supported 
by Bergstrom et al’s (2004) earlier piece of empirical work.  Given that results are indeed expected to 
vary dependent on existing bundles of goods, preferences and the particular public goods included in the 
TR mechanism, it is of interest to complete further research to determine how these welfare measures 
are likely to compare over different trade-offs, circumstances and locations.   
 
If findings are not consistent or cannot be a priori predicted, it becomes very important for efficiency 
reasons that policy evaluation and implementation is carried out using the correct PV context.  For 
example, if a CV evaluation of a particular policy indicates that CS is greater than CTR, with the cost of 
the policy lying somewhere between the two, implementation of the policy will only be efficient if it is 
financed out of new taxes, rather than a reduction in existing public goods.  Furthermore, even if a 
policy is efficient when examined under a TR mechanism with a general bundle of public goods, it may 
not be when evaluated using the specific public good, for example education, which the public funds are 
actually to be deferred from.   
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Indeed, if future empirical work continues to confirm that the equivalence of CTR and CS in valuation 
studies varies by situation, it is essential that future CV studies use the true likely context of payment.  
Given that a reallocation of taxation funds is likely to be a common means of public policy financing, 
this suggests that there is likely to be an important role for the tax reallocation payment vehicle in future 
CV investigations.   
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 APPENDIX A  - SURVEY EXCERPT 
Product Tax Scenario 
New labelling for Non-GM food 
Our government is considering a new law that would require all foods are separated into GM and Non-
GM food and clearly state their GM content. 
For such a programme, the extra cost of separating, transporting, inspecting and labelling Non-GM food 
is estimated to be £X for every £100 spent on food by each household. 
The cost of providing people with the chance of being able to distinguish, choose, and afford Non-GM 
foods would be passed onto the consumer.  This would increase the prices of Non-GM foods. 
Q1 If you are asked to vote on this program and it would cost your household an extra £X for every 
£100 you spend on food to ensure all foods clearly state their GM content, would you vote yes or no? 
⁪ Yes, I would be in favour of this programme (Please go to Q2a) 
⁪ I wouldn’t be in favour if the increase is £X but I may support such a programme at some lower 
amount (Please skip Q2) 
⁪ No, I’m against this programme  (Please go to Q2b) 
⁪ I don’t know (Please skip Q2) 
Q2a If Yes, how much food would you consume under the new programme? 
⁪ As much as usual  ⁪ 30% less 
⁪ 5% less  ⁪ 40% less 
⁪ 10% less  ⁪ More than usual 
⁪ 20% less  ⁪ Other ………….. 
Q2b If No, why are you against this programme? 
⁪ I’m not worried about GM foods   ⁪ This amount is too high 
⁪ People who buy Non-GM food should pay the extra price ⁪ I need more information 
⁪ The companies that produce GM food should pay the cost ⁪ Other ………………….. 
⁪ The government should pay   
 
Tax Reallocation Scenario 
New labelling for Non-GM food 
Our government is considering a new law that would require all foods are separated into GM and Non-
GM food and clearly state their GM content. 
This increases the price of Non-GM foods and would particularly affect lower income households. 
Some believe that it is the government’s obligation to provide all people with the chance of being able 
to distinguish, choose and afford Non-GM food. 
One means of covering this cost would be to use some of the funds from the government purse. In this 
case the price of Non-GM foods would NOT increase and NO new taxes would be introduced.  Yet the 
money used for such inspections could no longer be used to other public services. 
Q1 If you are asked to vote on this programme and it would cost the government  £X of your family’s taxes for every 
£100 you spend on food to ensure that all foods clearly state their GM content, would you vote yes or no?  
⁪ Yes, I would be in favour of this programme (Please go to Q2a) 
⁪ I wouldn’t be in favour if the increase is £X but I may support such a programme at some lower 
amount (Please skip Q2) 
⁪ No, I’m against this programme  (Please go to Q2b) 
⁪ I don’t know (Please skip Q2) 
Q2a If Yes, how much food would you consume under the new programme? 
⁪ As much as usual  ⁪ 30% less 
⁪ 5% less  ⁪ 40% less 
⁪ 10% less  ⁪ More than usual 
⁪ 20% less  ⁪ Other ………….. 
Q2b If No, why are you against this programme? 
⁪ I’m not worried about GM foods   ⁪ This amount is too high 
⁪ People who buy Non-GM food should pay the extra price ⁪ I need more information 
⁪ The companies that produce GM food should pay the cost ⁪ Other ………………….. 
⁪ This money should be spent on other public services 
The complete survey, including demographic and attitudinal sections can be found in Kontoleon (2002). 
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 APPENDIX B – SUMMARY STATISTICS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
TABLE B1: Summary Statistics by Full Sample and PV Treatment 
Full Sample Standard Tax 
Treatment 
Tax Reallocation 
Treatment 
Variable 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Thaye’s T 
Statistic 
BIDPR 14.045 11.620 14.614 11.832 13.391 11.359 1.212 
GENDER 0.398 0.490 0.417 0.494 0.375 0.485 1.000 
AGEMD 52.531 16.551 52.905 16.421 52.100 16.720 0.559 
HH  2.632 1.412 2.624 1.392 2.641 1.436 -0.135 
CHILD 
(continuous) 
0.580 1.007 0.621 1.066 0.532 0.935 1.015 
EDU 
(continuous) 
3.281 1.305 3.263 1.331 3.302 1.276 -0.346 
INCOME 2906.868 2950.472 3065.954 3123.697 2724.046 2732.754 1.335 
F1 -0.004 0.978 0.009 0.977 0.002 0.981 0.0958 
F2 0.006 0.912 0.011 0.922 -0.001 0.901 0.166 
F3 0.012 0.869 0.023 0.865 -0.001 0.873 0.327 
F4 -0.004 0.841 0.000 0.803 -0.008 0.883 0.118 
F5 -0.002 0.820 0.001 0.844 -0.005 0.793 0.084 
Under a critical T-value of 1.96, a null hypothesis of equal means across the treatments is not rejected. 
 
TABLE B2: Comparison of Mean Values by Group 
Variable Households 
included in WTP4 
Households excluded from 
WTP4 (for protest / 
indifference) 
Households excluded from 
original sample 
GENDER 0.382 0.438 0.444 
AGEMD 52.406 52.843 65.175 
HH  2.629 2.641 2.068 
CHILD (continuous) 0.542 0.673 0.327 
EDU (continuous) 3.345 3.229 3.100 
INCOME 2994.834 2668.389 1978.667 
F1 0.059 -0.163 0.010 
F2 0.042 -0.083 -0.129 
F3 0.062 -0.111 -0.268 
F4 0.028 -0.082 0.090 
F5 -0.076 0.182 0.039 
 
TABLE B3: Initial Estimation Results using WTP4 
VARIABLE ST 
Marginal Effect 
 
P-value 
TR 
Marginal Effect 
 
P-value 
Constant -0.2110 0.2983 0.0005 0.9981 
BIDPR -0.0195 0.0000** -0.0094 0.0082** 
GENDER -0.0132 0.8405 0.0650 0.4486 
AGE 0.0074 0.0125** 0.0006 0.8389 
EDU -0.0475 0.5482 -0.0941 0.2703 
INCOME 0.0000 0.4032 0.0000 0.5487 
CHILD -0.0112 0.9197 -0.0537 0.6506 
HHOLD -0.0469 0.6608 0.1870 0.1125 
F1 0.0813 0.0441** 0.1690 0.0001** 
F2 0.1122 0.0138** 0.0656 0.1515 
F3 0.0281 0.5484 0.0940 0.0531* 
F4 -0.0925 0.0664* 0.0624 0.2240 
F5 -0.0887 0.0855* 0.0201 0.7076 
Pseudo R2 
Test sig ∼X2 ;  Prob > X2 
Prediction Success 
19.69% 
52.2900;  0.0000 
72.91% 
 12.76% 
31.2961;  0.0018 
70.06% 
 
** Significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
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APPENDIX C – CLASSIFICATION TABLES AND LIMDEP COMMAND FILE 
Table C1: Classification Table: PT Model 
Predicted Actual 
0 1 
TOTAL 
0 81 26 107 
1 28 68 96 
TOTAL 109 94 203 
PR (Actual = 0Predicted = 0) = 74.31% 
PR (Actual = 1Predicted = 1) = 72.34% 
PR (Predicted = 0Actual = 0) = 75.70% 
PR (Predicted = 1Actual = 1) = 70.83% 
Correctly classified = 73.40% 
 
Table C2: Classification Table: TR Model 
Predicted Actual 
0 1 
TOTAL 
0 61 29 90 
1 31 56 87 
TOTAL 92 85 177 
PR (Actual = 0Predicted = 0) = 66.30% 
PR (Actual = 1Predicted = 1) = 65.88% 
PR (Predicted = 0Actual = 0) = 67.78% 
PR (Predicted = 1Actual = 1) = 64.36% 
Correctly classified = 66.10% 
 
 
LIMDEP Command File Excerpt 
 
/* Create New Variables */ 
CREATE; LINCOME=LOG(INCOME); AGESQ=AGE*AGE; LBIDPR=LOG(BIDPR); BOUND= 
LOG((INCOME-BIDPR)/BIDPR) $ 
/* Summary Statistics */ 
SAMPLE; ALL $ 
DSTAT; RHS=BIDPR,GENDER,AGE,HH,CHILD,EDUDB,INCOME,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5 $ 
SAMPLE; 1-285 $ 
DSTAT; RHS=BIDPR,GENDER,AGE,HH,CHILD,EDUDB,INCOME,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5 $ 
SAMPLE; 286-533 $ 
DSTAT; RHS=BIDPR,GENDER,AGE,HH,CHILD,EDUDB,INCOME,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5 $ 
/* Final Estimation with WTP4 */ 
SAMPLE; 1-285 $ 
PROBIT; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,BIDPR,GENDER,AGE,AGESQ,EDU,LINCOME,CHILD, 
HHOLD,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5  ; MARGINAL EFFECTS $ 
SAMPLE; 286-533 $ 
PROBIT; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,BIDPR,GENDER,AGE,AGESQ,EDU,LINCOME,CHILD, 
HHOLD,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5  ; MARGINAL EFFECTS $ 
/* Initial Step of WTP Calculations with WTP4 */ 
SAMPLE; 1-285 $ PROBIT; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,BIDPR $ 
SAMPLE; 286-533 $ PROBIT; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,BIDPR $ 
SAMPLE; 1-285 $ PROBIT; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,LBIDPR $ 
SAMPLE; 286-533 $ PROBIT ; LHS=WTP4; RHS=ONE,LBIDPR $ 
SAMPLE; 1-285 $ PROBIT; LHS = WTP4 ; RHS = ONE, BOUND $ 
SAMPLE; 286-533 $ PROBIT; LHS = WTP4 ; RHS = ONE, BOUND $ 
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APPENDIX D – HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
PV Hypothesis Test 1 
H0: WTPPT = WTPTR ; H1: WTPPT ≠ WTPTR  
µPT = 11.98; SPT = 2.14; NPT = 203 
µTR = 11.91; S  = 4.91; N  = 177 TR( ) TR
TRPTP
TRPT
NNS
T
/1/1 +
−= µµ   
T has a student’s t distribution with NPT + NTR – 2 (378) degrees of freedom, and a critical value of 
approximately 1.96 under a 5% level of significance two-tailed t test. 
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As T does not exceed the critical value, the null hypothesis that the mean WTP under each PV is equal 
cannot be rejected. 
 
PV Hypothesis Test 2 – Allowing for Indifference 
H0: WTPPTIND = WTPTRIND; H1: WTPPTIND ≠ WTPTRIND  
µPT = 11.98; SPT = 2.14; VPT = 4.5796; NPT = 203; NPTIND = 19; NTOTPT = 222 
µTR = 11.91; STR = 4.91; VTR = 24.1081; NTR = 177; NPTIND = 21; NTOTTR = 198 
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As T in this second hypothesis test does not exceed the critical value, the null hypothesis that the mean 
WTP under each PV is equal again cannot be rejected.  
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